The Christ Centred Cosmic Civilisation
Rod Dreher wrote “to order the world rightly as Christians requires regarding all things as pointing to Christ”
Christ is the One in Whom in all things consist and humanity is not the measure of all things. If a defining characteristic of the modern world is disorder then the most fundamental act of resistance is to discover and life according to the deep, divine order of the heavens and the earth.
In this series we want to look at the big model of the universe that the Bible and Christian history provides.
It is a mind and heart expanding vision of reality.
It is not confined to the limits of our bodily senses - but tries to embrace levels fo reality that are not normally accessible or tangible to our exiled life on earth.
We live on this side of the cosmic curtain - and therefore the highest and greatest dimensions of reality are hidden to us… yet these dimensions exist and are the most fundamental framework for the whole of the heavens and the earth.
Throughout this series we want to pick away at all the threads of reality to see how they all join together - how they all find common meaning and reason in the great divine logic - the One who is the Logos, the LORD Jesus Christ - the greatest that both heaven and earth has to offer.
Colossians 1:15-23
The Christ Centred Cosmic Civilisation
Episode 77 - The Influence of Context on Scientific Interpretation
Unlock the secrets of how evidence and theory intertwine to shape our scientific beliefs within a Christ-Centered Cosmic Civilization. Join us as we challenge the traditional view that observations straightforwardly support a single hypothesis. With insights from Helen Longino's framework, we explore the nuanced connections between sentences, states of affairs, and propositions, revealing the underlying structures of scientific understanding. This episode promises to transform your perception of how personal and social contexts influence the way we interpret facts and form scientific knowledge.
Discover the complex dance between facts, beliefs, and hypotheses, where background assumptions play a pivotal role in how evidence is perceived and utilized. We delve into scenarios like diagnosing medical conditions to illustrate how different beliefs can lead to diverse interpretations of the same data. Witness how two individuals might view the same evidence in entirely different ways due to their background beliefs. By the end of this episode, you'll grasp how scientific knowledge is a vibrant tapestry woven from diverse perspectives, rather than a fixed set of universal truths. Join us for a thought-provoking journey into the heart of scientific inquiry.
The theme music is "Wager with Angels" by Nathan Moore
Well, welcome to the Christ-Centered Cosmic Civilization. And we're going to continue to explore the kind of methodology of science and beliefs affect science and whether it is possible or even desirable to exclude those personal and social contexts and values and beliefs and how that could be done and would it produce better science or not to do that. What we want to do now is look more at how evidence works and evidence and theory. No matter what view of the value-free character of science is taken, a connection between evidence and theory is assumed by all scientists. So it doesn't really matter whether you think if we only apply the rules, the constitutive rules of science properly, we'll get perfect science and that any social and personal context is bad science. Or we might think, go to the other end and say no, all science is personal, social, contextual and there is no way to have anything that is like an objective science. It doesn't really matter about that on this question question, because everybody agrees that evidence and theory are connected. So what we want to do now is examine what kind of relations there can be between evidence and theory and what enables a person to see a connection between evidence and theory, between a set of observations and a particular theory that they hold. So let's go back to Helen Longano again, as she helpfully summarizes three kinds of relations between evidence and hypothesis. So the first one she considers is this a relation between a sentence describing a state of affairs state of affairs said to be evidence and a sentence the hypothesis for which the state of affairs is said to be evidence. So this is kind of looking at the relation between one sentence and another sentence that humans speak.
Speaker 1:So, for example, let's think of two sentences. We might say the first sentence might be this book is made of paper. And my second sentence might be all books are made of paper. And my second sentence might be all books are made of paper. And then we want to know what's the relationship between those two sentences. And one we might say I've got some evidence. Here is a book that's made of paper. That sentence says here is a book made of paper or book. This book is made of paper. And then we've got a hypothesis. That's another sentence All books are made of paper. Or what about these two other sentences? We might say this book is available on Kindle as an e-book. And then we might have another sentence that says not all books are made of paper. So in the first example, those two sentences, the first, you know this book is made of paper. Another sentence all books are made of paper. The first is a consequence of the second. If all books are made of paper, then this book that I'm holding must be made of paper. That's the relation between those two sentences. And in the second one, if I say this book is available as an e-book, then the logical consequence of that is another sentence Not all books are made of paper.
Speaker 1:Now, ok, we can, we can see that we can make, there can be sentences and they can be related to each other as evidence to theory or consequence and so on. But the weakness of this kind of relation, the relation between sentences, is that it doesn't cover many examples and certainly won't cover the wide range of complex relations that make up the actual practices and beliefs of a scientific community. And that's because we're not and this is what's going to take us on to the second thing it's not sentences that as such that are being studied. A scientist is not studying sentences. I suppose an analytical philosopher tends to do that study sentences. But the scientist isn't strictly studying sentences.
Speaker 1:So let's think of a second way of relating evidence and hypothesis. So the second heading could be this it could be a relation between a state of affairs said to be evidence and another state of affairs described by the hypothesis for which the former is said to be evidence. So in this it's not the sentences that are being related, but the state of affairs, the situations. So, for example, identifying that a particular book was made of paper may be part of the evidence. That may be part of the evidence that for the hypothesis or the state of affairs that all books are made of paper may also be taken to describe the state of affairs that a tree has been cut down and destroyed, a line of condensation in a cloud chamber might be said to be evidence for the passage of some type of particle through the apparatus.
Speaker 1:So the first state of the first yeah, ok, I mean when I originally studied this I went into quite a deep analysis of how those two different situations show. One is evidential relation in virtue of class inclusion, and the next example is in virtue of causal relations, and let's not worry about that too much now. The point being is so in the first example we were analyzing sentences. In the second example it's not the sentences, but the state of affairs A book is made of paper. Another state of affairs that is a consequence of that is, say, a tree has been destroyed.
Speaker 1:But let's think of a third set of relation between evidence and theory or evidence and a hypothesis. This is number three A relation between a state of affairs said to be evidence and a statement or proposition, the hypothesis for which the former is said to be evidence. When I, when I and this is all quoting Helen Longano, let me, let me read that again. Helen Longano's third one is this that there is a relation between a state of affairs said to be evidence and a statement or proposition, the hypothesis for which the former is said to be evidence. So now we've got the relation. So in the first example it was the relationship between two sentences. In the second one it's a relationship between two states of affair, and now it's the relationship between a state of affairs and a statement about that state of affairs. So the books being made of paper might be someone's evidence for the hypothesis, the statement that a tree was destroyed. So can you see, we've looked at, is it the relationship between two sentences, two states of affairs? But then we're saying, well, it's really an attempt to relate a state of affairs to a sentence, a hypothesis, a theory, so that first kind of evidential relation, the relationship between two sentences, is only ever really encountered in philosophical discussions, and it's not really what science is about.
Speaker 1:Science is about so when does a state of affairs or an observation become evidence for something? And that's by no means straightforward. When does a state of affairs become evidence for something? And that is hard See.
Speaker 1:Let's take this the number of platelets in a blood sample doesn't mean anything by itself. A state of affairs furs on it just on its own. A mere state of affairs doesn't mean anything by itself, or put it this way, it doesn't yield up anything other than, like burr, data. It doesn't yield up anything other than, say, the amount of platelets in a blood sample. The number of platelets found in a person's blood at successive periods doesn't mean anything in and of itself. The samples don't come with a theory, an explanation, a description of what these observations might be taken as evidence for.
Speaker 1:So it's not as if, as soon as you look at the blood sample, like, the blood sample tells you the meaning of that. It's silent. You look at it and you could say, ah, this is how many platelets are in this sample. But that, and if you give that information to somebody who knows absolutely nothing about blood, it doesn't mean that that can conveys nothing to them. And even if you said, and here are successive results on a week by week basis and there's like a decrease of them in each one, there's like that in itself, is that a good thing? Is that a bad thing? Does it have any meaning at all? Is it right? Is it? Is it? Do you see what I mean? It doesn't mean anything, that it's a me, it's mere information. It doesn't actually say anything, just the state of affairs.
Speaker 1:Helen longano says this any attempt to find some unique or direct relation between states of affairs and those hypotheses for which they are taken as evidence reveals, in fact, that there is no such relation and that anything that is the case or is imagined to be the case can be taken to be evidence that something else is the case. See what I mean. So what's it saying? Is it's not as if those blood samples mean only one possible thing and they end up to merely look at those states of affairs is to logically essentially arrive at only one possible hypothesis. There are many things that may be true on the basis of those samples and what is the hypothesis that will be ventured? See, let me go on, let Helen Lunganow go on.
Speaker 1:She says what determines whether or not someone will take some fact as evidence for some hypothesis is not a natural relation between that state of affairs and that described by the hypothesis and that described by the hypothesis, but the relation is other beliefs that person has concerning the evidential connection between the state of affairs and the hypothesis. See, so it's saying it's not as if to merely look at the sample essentially, naturally, logically, forces you to one conclusion. Rather, you have beliefs and are asking particular questions. You take those samples to be evidence of a hypothesis, but the connection between the state of affairs and the hypothesis is not automatic. What connects those samples to a hypothesis are beliefs, convictions about blood and so on. So the evidential relations between an observation statement and a belief may be varied. They may the relations between you know, a state of affairs and a hypothesis. There's loads of loads of relations between those things and widely divergent according to the beliefs and assumptions held about the states involved. And of course it doesn't mean that some of those beliefs may correspond to the nature of reality better than others, obviously, and that's something that we'll probe as we go on. How do you know if a set of beliefs corresponds better than another? But there's many, many beliefs that can be held and many connections drawn between a state of affairs and a hypothesis, and different beliefs may give rise to different hypotheses, or different beliefs may arrive at the same hypothesis, and so on. So it's noting that there are a variety of beliefs and assumptions, but that that is what's going on. So Helen Longano provides a good example of this principle that we're exploring here.
Speaker 1:One might be led to believe that a child has measles because she has spots on her stomach. Usually, the evidential relation depends on the belief that red spots on the stomach are a symptom of a disease called measles measles. However, one might come to believe that the child has measles because a crystal ball reader predicted that if the child's stomach had red spots on it on a given day, then they would have a disease called measles. Now, if you believe that the crystal ball reader was a reliable source of information, then the evidential relation between the red spots and measles wouldn't be causal but dependent upon the crystal ball reader. So in this strange example, the same conclusion could be reached but very different evidential relations would hold. So that's the illustration there.
Speaker 1:You've got a state of affairs, a hypothesis, and there are different beliefs that might connect those, and even coming to the same hypothesis might happen with very, very different beliefs. That might connect those, and even coming to the same hypothesis might happen with very, very different beliefs. So all we're trying to do here is understand that there are states of affairs and then a theory, a hypothesis, and we're just trying to note that there isn't an automatic entailment, that this state of affairs requires this and only this hypothesis, and that there is only one linkage between the state of affairs and the hypothesis. There could be many beliefs that arrive at the same hypothesis or different hypotheses and so on, many beliefs that arrive at the same hypothesis or different hypotheses and so on. And we're just noting that there are beliefs and convictions that connect states of affairs with hypotheses, theories. So here's again Helen leads us on the same state of affairs.
Speaker 1:Again, helen leads us on the same state of affairs might be taken as evidence for quite different hypotheses. So if one believed that red spots on the stomach were a sign of a gastric disorder, stomach upset. Then one would point to the spots as evidence for one's position over against a claim that it was a symptom of viral infection called measles. So you can imagine two doctors pointing to the same symptom and one taking it to be evidence for one hypothesis and one taking it to be evidence for another hypothesis, and you can easily and we may have experienced this in our own journeys through healthcare that there could be a set of symptoms that quite genuinely are associated with a wide variety of possible causes and in one situation they're taken as evidence for one hypothesis and in a different situation, with a different doctor, different consultant, different scan, different test leads to the conviction of a different hypothesis as taken as evidence for a different hypothesis. So the same states of affairs can be taken as evidence for quite different hypotheses. Why? Because of differing beliefs or different convictions or different weighing of beliefs and so on. So on the one hand, different beliefs might cause one to pick out different features of a state of affairs in order to argue for different hypotheses. So here now we're saying there's the state of affairs, with lots of details about the state of affairs, and different beliefs may enable a person to notice different features about the state of affairs and that leads them to different hypotheses. And that leads them to different hypotheses Now.
Speaker 1:We can find a good example of this in the controversy surrounding Galileo's claims. Now, I picked this particularly because when I did my postdoctoral research on this scientific methodology, I really zoomed in on this issue of Galileo at the time and looked hard at what led people to different conclusions and how justified were they in the conclusions they arrived at and things like that. But it's particularly interesting this thing about pointing to the same sets of observations and arriving at incredibly different hypotheses based on the exact same set of observations. Aristotelians and Galileo and his fans We'll call those the Galileans. I was going to say the Galileans, but that would be as if they were from Galilee. But both the Aristotelians and the Galileans referred to the same observations of the planets in support of their respective theories. In Galileo's case, he encouraged the Aristotelians to look through his telescope at the change in size of the planets at different times of the year. He did this to illustrate his proposal.
Speaker 1:However, his opponents pointed to the same observations to argue against him. Whereas his observations were a problem for their belief in the immutability of the heavenly bodies, the observations didn't on the this. But you see, on the one hand, yeah, they could see that, ah, those planets are varying in size, but we believed that they were immutable, so that created a problem for them. But you see, on the other hand, the observations didn't quite correspond to what Galileo said they would. And Galileo himself admits that the features of the observation that his opponents picked out were devastating for his theory. He admits that in his own private journals, that they were pointing out observations that were against his hypothesis and theory. So here's a quotation. This is from Galileo himself and he says this I cannot get over my amazement that Copernicus was constantly willing to persist in saying that Venus might go around the sun and might be more than six times as far from us at one time as at another, and still look always equal, when it should have appeared 40 times larger.
Speaker 1:40 times larger. Mars, when it is close to us, would have to look 60 times as large as when it is most distant. Yet no such difference is to be seen. Rather, when it is in opposition to the sun and close to us, it shows itself only four or five times as large as when, at conjunction, it becomes hidden behind the rays of the sun. That's the end of Galileo's quote. So you get his point. He's saying like, according to my hypothesis, there should be a much greater variation in the size of Venus and Mars, but that isn't observed. That's the state of affairs, and so you know.
Speaker 1:His opponents were pointing to that exact same state of affairs to argue for their hypothesis. And then he's pointing to the exact same state of affairs to show that their hypothesis can't be right. They point to it to show his hypothesis can't be right. But they're all looking at exactly the same state of affairs and referring to the same sort of observations and so different features. So because he's looking at it and saying, but do you notice this feature? And they're saying, ah, but do you notice this feature? And they're saying, ah, but do you notice this feature? See, different features of a state of affairs are used by observers from different belief structures. So their different beliefs are leading them to different conclusions, leading them to different conclusions. What is considered a relevant feature of the state of affairs is a product of the contextual values of the observer. So let me repeat that because it's super key in the argument. Really, what is considered a relevant feature of the state of affairs is a product of the contextual values of the observer. Let me conclude with one final quotation from Helen Longano, and then we will move to a slightly different tack. So this is this final concluding paragraph for this section.
Speaker 1:How one determines evidential relevance.
Speaker 1:Why one takes some state of affairs as evidence for one hypothesis rather than for another depends on one's other beliefs, which we can call background beliefs. Thus, a given state of affairs can be taken as evidence for the same hypothesis in the light of differing background beliefs, and it can be taken as evidence for quite different and even conflicting hypotheses, given appropriately conflicting background beliefs, given appropriately conflicting background beliefs. Similarly, different aspects of one's state of affairs can be taken as evidence for the same hypothesis in light of differing background beliefs, and they can serve as evidence for different and even conflicting hypotheses, given appropriately conflicting background beliefs. Okay, like that's that big paragraph and she's simply drawing that conclusion that the person's background beliefs are very relevant in how a state of affairs or set of observations or collection of data to connect a state of affairs and a hypothesis depends on background beliefs, and those background beliefs may lead to totally different hypotheses. Those background beliefs may lead to totally different hypothesis. The background beliefs may enable a person to notice different features of the state of affairs. No-transcript.